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Early Modern Dutch corporate finance had two notable features, a remarkable ease of raising 
large amounts of capital and a flexible legal framework. Having pioneered new corporate forms 
with two intercontinental trading companies, Dutch business adopted such forms on a wider 
scale only during the 18th century, when economic concentration and consolidation led to the 
appearance of business units large enough to need them. The financial intermediation and legal 
institutions available also facilitated early industrialization during the 19th century, up to and 
including the railways. The large export of capital throughout the period under consideration 
failed to harm economic development at any point or in any way. 
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1.  Introduction 
Corporate finance examines the extent to which the allocation of capital to business operations is 
efficient. Modern markets offer entrepreneurs a great variety of financial instruments, but these 
instruments may be reduced to variations of two basic forms, equity and debt. The holders of 
equity normally have control rights and are, as residual claimants, entitled to dividends and to 
increases in the value of their shares. Debtholders receive predefined and prescheduled interest 
payments, and have no control rights as long as borrowers meet their obligations. The financial 
economics literature explains optimal security design in terms of streamlining the flow of capital 
to businesses whilst reducing agency costs to a minimum (Becht, Bolton and Röell, 2003; Tirole, 
2005). These latter costs reside in the fact that, when financiers as principals provide funds to 
agents (entrepreneurs, managers), the financiers have an information disadvantage and their 
interest may diverge from those of their agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, agency 
costs arise as a result of conflicts of interest between different claimholders, in particular 
shareholders and creditors. The relative efficiency of a country’s capital market is therefore best 
examined by looking at the financing of large businesses, because the involvement of external 
investors in them means that we can observe the extent to which the instruments used did 
provide the finance required at minimal agency costs.  
 The evolution of the Dutch capital market during the 1602-1850 period is particularly 
relevant in this respect. Having pioneered remarkably modern-looking corporate finance 
practices and institutions during the early 17th century, Amsterdam rapidly developed into 
Europe’s leading financial market, a position it held for almost two centuries (Riley 1980, Jonker 
and Sluyterman 2000, Gelderblom and Jonker 2004, Petram 2011a, b).  During the 18th century 
the Dutch gradually lost their economic lead and failed to embark on industrialization until 
second half of the 19th century, a fact widely blamed at the time and since on conservative 
investors preferring an astounding array of foreign securities to home ventures (Jonker 1991, 
1996, Van Zanden and Van Riel 2004). With foreign investment totalling an estimated 1,500 
million guilders around 1800 there certainly was enough capital available. However, it is now 
generally accepted that a lack of opportunities boosted this sum, rather than an inherent distaste 
for domestic investment. While we can therefore no longer see an inadequate capital supply as 
causing the comparatively slow Dutch industrialization, it is still worthwhile to examine 
corporate finance up to 1850 to see how it evolved under radically different conditions.  
 Two features stand out overall. First, the remarkable ease with which, from before the 
start of the Dutch Golden Age until the mid-19th century, very large sums could be raised on a 
market that looks invertebrate to modern eyes, that is to say, without institutions such as big 
banking firms or specialized securities exchanges to structure the issuing of and trade in 
financial instruments. Second, the flexibility of the legal framework which, judging by an 
apparent paucity of litigation over debt and equity contracts, adapted to new business 
requirements as they emerged. Both features originated in the peculiar conditions shaping 
Dutch trade and finance. Markets were literally open to all and to everything; the exchanges 
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in main trading centres such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam were public, anyone with anything 
to sell or buy, commodities, services, money, or securities, could come and do business with 
anyone else (Jonker and Sluyterman 2000). A wide range of people did indeed find reason to 
visit the exchanges because the wealth accumulated during the Dutch Golden Age was quite 
widely dispersed, creating a fairly large public prepared to invest even modest sums in 
financial instruments ranging from shipping shares via public bonds to more complex 
investment products such as tontines or mutual funds. Finally, the keen commercial rivalry 
between cities kept everyone, businessmen, financiers, investors, and officials, on their toes. 
Initiatives or innovations which failed in one city would, if viable, quickly be taken up in 
another, as much a premium on inventiveness as an effective check on complacency and 
closed shops (Gelderblom 2013).   
 Now for most of the period under consideration large corporations formed an 
exception in Dutch business, mostly found in the intercontinental trade, insurance, colonial 
plantations, and occasionally in manufacturing. Their number remained quite small; most 
economic activities were conducted by firms with typically one or two, sometimes three, 
partners, and financed with retained earnings, trade credit, lombarding of (i.e. loans 
collateralized by) commodities or securities, and contributions from family; in farming, 
mortgages were also used. Our narrow focus on large corporations financed by external 
investors in the form of debt or equity claims on open markets should not be taken to mean 
that we consider these alternative forms of finance any less significant. Indeed, in terms of 
economic importance for commercial, industrial, and agricultural activity, they most likely 
dominated. As noted above, however, a capital market’s efficiency is best gauged by looking 
at the challenges posed by large business concerns, and this is what we will do. We first 
sketch the evolution from private partnerships to chartered public companies (Section 2, 
1602-1680) and then describe the wave of new initiatives and forms of organization until the 
Republic’s demise (Section 3, 1680-1795). In Section 4, 1795-1850, we describe the 
transitional period from a largely mercantile economy to the first stirrings of industrialization. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. From partnerships to chartered public companies, 1602-1680 
By the early 16th century Antwerp had become northern Europe’s main centre of international 
trade and finance (Van der Wee 1963, 1993). To sustain the commercial capital of his sprawling 
empire, Emperor Charles V issued legal rules for key commercial transactions such as the 
transfer of bonds and bills of exchange, thereby considerably widening the scope of Antwerp’s 
financial market and thus facilitating the city’s fast expanding trade (De Smedt 1940-1941, Van 
der Wee 1993). Merchants from the Low Countries, roughly the area of present-day Netherlands 
and Belgium, started to explore ever more adventurous trade destinations: Russia, Italy, the 
Levant, West Africa, the Americas. To mitigate the risk of such undertakings, they appended 
clauses specifying purpose, duration, capital invested, and partners’ individual tasks to existing 
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partnership contracts (Van Brakel 1908, 1912, 1914, 1917; Van der Heijden, 1908, 1914; Van 
Gelder, 1916; Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 2011). Such clauses effectively limited the 
partners’ joint and several liability to actions undertaken in accordance with the stated 
specifications. Specific-purpose partnerships were often designed for a short period, say a 
particular operation or one sailing season, but if the partners so wished they lasted for several 
years. In Holland, the biggest and economically most diversified province of the northern Low 
Countries, shipping companies were formally liquidated after a trip or a season, but as a rule 
shareholders would sign on again, thereby creating a continuous enterprise in practice, if not in 
law. The shipping company format or rederij also found application in other sectors such as 
industrial windmills. 
 Shipping companies could draw on three sources of finance. Firstly, as a rule ship 
suppliers such as shipwrights, ropemakers, anchor smiths, and biscuit bakers took equity in 
payment for all or part of their input of labour or goods. Secondly, shares broken down into 
fractions as small as 1/64th or even 1/132nd of a ship found their way into the portfolios of 
numerous small investors all over the county. Finally, shipping companies could raise money 
with bottomry contracts (bodemerij in Dutch). Essentially a combination of insurance with 
finance, bottomry contracts enabled a shipping company to raise a loan, for instance to finance 
an expedition, while transferring the inherent risks to the creditors. If the ship failed to return 
they lost their money. If it did complete the trip, they were repaid with a premium called opgeld, 
varying from 15 per cent for relatively safe trips to Russia to more than 30 per cent for 
intercontinental expeditions. In modern finance, the use of bottomry contracts corresponds to a 
combination of common and preferred stock. Outsiders held preferred stock and a fixed 
maximum payoff, while the inside shareholders held the common stock entitling them to the 
residual payoffs. From the creditors’ perspective the contract combined a loan with an embedded 
insurance contract for the amount of the principal, the opgeld equalling the sum of the insurance 
premium plus the interest on the loan. Over time the use of bottomry contracts in shipping 
appears to have declined as cheaper alternatives such as bills of exchange and common transport 
insurance became available, but the Dutch West India Company or WIC did still use them 
regularly, as we will see.  
 From the late 1560s onwards Antwerp’s pre-eminence came under increasing pressure 
when a recession combined with religious tensions to spark the Low Countries into revolt against 
their Habsburg overlord Philip II. The ensuing civil war effectively split the country into two, the 
northern half becoming the Dutch Republic, the southern half remaining under Habsburg control 
as the Spanish and later Austrian Netherlands. For a long time Antwerp aligned with the 
Protestant north, but in 1585 the city fell to the Spanish, after which the rebels choked off its 
overseas trade by blocking the Scheldt river. Protestants emigrated in large numbers, many of 
them to the Dutch Republic, where they contributed to the extraordinary surge in economic 
growth which started during the 1590s, once the country’s survival seemed secure (Gelderblom 
2000). Amsterdam positioned itself to take up Antwerp’s mantle, upgrading its commercial 
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infrastructure so as to suit the needs of international trade. Regulations were issued governing 
maritime insurance and the regular publication of commodity prices, the Antwerp costuymen or 
rulebook covering a range of commercial transactions was adopted as local law, the Wisselbank 
or Exchange Bank was set up to facilitate payments (1609) and an exchange modelled on that of 
Antwerp was built (1611) (Lesger 2006). The Republic’s highly urbanized and commercialized 
western provinces were as a whole ideally placed to profit from the shift of economic activity 
from South to North (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997). Landlocked cities such as Haarlem 
and Leiden expanded existing manufacturing activities, in particular cloth production, while port 
cities seized new opportunities such as the opening of trade with Asia, previously the domain of 
Spanish and Portuguese merchants. Between 1595 and 1601 no fewer than seven cities sent 
expeditions to Asia for a total of 65 ships.  
 These expeditions, termed voorcompagnieën in Dutch, showed a further evolution of the 
specific-purpose partnership in the sense that they had a rudimentary board which managed the 
venture (Van Brakel 1908, Van der Heijden 1908, Mansvelt 1922, Den Heijer 2005, Gelderblom, 
De Jong and Jonker 2011). A number of merchants organized and ran the enterprise, each with a 
specific task, for which they received a percentage of money or goods handled as remuneration. 
The other shareholders, recruited by the merchants through their network, were sleeping partners 
who did not take part in operational decisions and had to wait for information and accounts upon 
the return of the ships, as a rule 2-3 years. The partnership was then liquidated, though most 
shareholders would roll over their participation into the next expedition organized by the same 
merchants. The voorcompagnieën were financed by a mixture of shareholders’ equity and debt 
raised on personal account by the merchants, the partnership lacking the legal personality and 
limited liability required to take debt in its own name (Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 
forthcoming).  
 Competition between the voorcompagnieën drove purchase prices of spices up in Asia 
and selling prices down in Europe, while at the same time undermining the Republic’s fragile 
political unity and damaging the prospects of building a firm Dutch presence in Asia in the face 
of hostility from Spanish, Portuguese, and British merchants. Moreover, in the face of bitter 
continued fighting against Spain on the Republic’s southern borders, it made sense to lift the 
pressure by attacking the Luso-Hispanic overseas empire. Consequently the Dutch Estates 
General pressured the six voorcompagnieën that were  active in 1602 into merging to form the 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC, United East India Company), set up with a very 
large capital of 6.4 million guilders subscribed by some 1,800 shareholders from all over the 
Republic (Gaastra 2003). Managed by their original directors or bewindhebbers, the six 
voorcompagnieën were transformed into local chambers, semi-autonomous units running a part 
of the company’s operations proportional to their share in the overall capital. Representatives 
from the chambers formed the Heren XVII, the VOC’s central policy board.  
 The VOC was a hybrid organization, a specific-purpose partnership modified to suit 
public tasks. Its charter harnessed the commercial aspirations of the merchants leading the 
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voorcompagnieën to the military and political goals of the state by giving the company a 
monopoly on the Asian trade plus rights to wage war and conclude treaties in the Estates 
General’s name. Mirroring other official bodies such as the admiralties, water boards, and polder 
boards, the charter ensured the proper execution of the company’s public functions by giving the 
government access to operational data, the right to monitor policy and control of board 
appointments (Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker 2011). Conversely, the shareholders received no 
continuous access to information, nor any control or appointment rights at all; their rights were 
limited to examination of the full accounts after ten years, when the company would be 
liquidated and a new one set up to complete the charter’s twenty-year term, a dividend 
entitlement if available cash reached 5 per cent of capital, and the ability to exit in the form of 
clear procedure for transferring registered shares. This right to transfer ownership produced two 
probably unintended consequences. Share trading started almost immediately after the closing of 
subscriptions, and it predominantly took the form of forward transactions minimizing the transfer 
formalities via mutual clearing (Gelderblom and Jonker 2004, Petram 2011). From there it was 
only a small step to futures and options trading, which had appeared by the 1630s (Van Dillen 
1964, Gelderblom and Jonker 2005, Petram 2011). The shareholders, excluded from the 
company’s management and possessing fungible shares, probably enjoyed limited liability. 
However, the bewindhebbers or managers did not. The charter exempted them from having to 
account for their administration until 1612 and from claims against their person for pay 
arrears, while leaving them jointly and severally liable for the conduct of the cashiers and 
bookkeepers who they appointed, and for any debt. Consequently when in 1611 the Estates of 
Zeeland wanted to force the Middelburg chamber to settle an old debt, it did not threaten to 
sequestrate the chamber’s property, but to take bewindhebbers into custody. This unlimited 
liability meant that the VOC could not raise more debt than the personal standing of its 
directors allowed (Schalk, Gelderblom and Jonker, 2012; Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 
forthcoming).  
 The VOC therefore possessed three characteristics of modern corporations, that is to 
say a separation of ownership and management, limited liability for shareholders, and 
transferable shares, but lacked three more, i.e. a permanent capital, full limited liability for 
managers, and legal personhood (Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 2013; Dari-Matiacci, 
Gelderblom, Jonker, and Perotti, 2013). Moreover, the company’s flawed corporate 
governance structure, the state having all power and shareholders none, deviated from both 
contemporary and modern norms, and created serious agency problems. The Estates General 
pushed for warfare on such a scale that the company failed to pay a dividend, leading a group 
of disgruntled shareholders led by Isaac Le Maire to try and force a change of policy by 
organizing a bear raid on the shares with coordinated short sales in 1609 (Van Dillen 1930, 
Petram 2011a, b). To appease shareholders the VOC started disbursements, largely in kind, so as 
to conserve cash and clear overstocks of spices at the same time. Totaling 162.5 per cent over the 
first ten years, the dividend showed the board treating its shareholders as bondholders by 
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repaying their initial subscription plus ten times the prevailing interest rate of 6.25 per cent. A 
subtle change in the term used to describe them, from participants to actionisten, i.e. those with a 
claim to certain payments, showed a similar intention to put shareholders at a distance 
(Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker 2011). They were finally moved to the sidelines in 1612. The 
VOC’s position had deteriorated to such an extent that the board, arguing that disclosure would 
frighten investors away, obtained permission from the Estates General to ignore the charter 
injunction to publish accounts, liquidate, and set up a new company (Dari-Matiacci, Gelderblom, 
Jonker, and Perotti, 2013). In the run-up to the 1622 charter renewal shareholders began a 
determined campaign to obtain some control over the company but, despite support from the 
Estates of Zeeland and the Estates General, this initiative foundered on stubborn resistance by the 
VOC, backed by the Estates of Holland. The few concessions to shareholders’ demands in the 
new charter remained a dead letter (De Jongh 2011).  
 Thus state intervention rendered the VOC’s temporary capital de facto permanent, and at 
the same time cut off the possibility of raising more equity, since that would require changing the 
charter to address demands for more investor power (Dari-Matiacci, Gelderblom, Jonker, and 
Perotti, forthcoming). As a result, the VOC came to rely entirely on debt to supplement its 
funding from retained earnings. Unable to eliminate the bottleneck of unlimited liability in the 
short term and facing an immediate cash shortfall, the board devised an ingenious solution. In the 
Spring of 1613 it opened subscriptions to a contract offering a 5 per cent premium in return for 
guaranteeing to pay the VOC up to 3.2 million guilders in case the fleet then leaving port failed 
to generate revenues worth that sum by a set date (Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 2013). 
This insurance against a potential shortage of cash to equip a fleet in 1617 remedied the inability 
to raise more debt under the constraints of unlimited liability; the British East India Company 
repeatedly used a similar contract for exactly the same purposes during the 1630s and 1640s 
(Stapel and Den Dooren de Jong 1928). As it happened rising revenues lifted the VOC out of 
immediate trouble so it did not need the insurance again, giving the board time to centralize 
financial policy. In 1617 the directors signed a mutual guarantee for debts taken on by any one of 
their number on behalf of his chamber. This may have been prompted by a legal opinion 
published two years before that they were all liable for such debt anyway, but a formal guarantee 
also enabled all chambers to borrow more cheaply via Amsterdam. The company’s debt rose 
immediately, but the appearance of bonds from elsewhere signed by Amsterdam directors 
appears to have raised eyebrows. In 1623 the Amsterdam chamber, referring to a dispute with 
investors over the directors’ personal liability for debt, adopted a new form of bond contract 
specifically excluding that liability, thereby indirectly giving the company legal personhood 
(Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 2013). Presumably by that time the company’s tangible 
assets such as offices, warehouses, yards, and ships inspired sufficient confidence for investors 
not to need further assurances, as debt continued to rise. Moreover, from the mid-1630s the 
board started to pay dividends roughly linked to revenues, boosting the share price and quelling 
the debate over the VOC’s corporate governance. Debt averaged about 10-12 million guilders 
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during the rest of the 17th century (De Korte 1984). During the 1670s the board changed its 
issuing policy by introducing a higher yielding form of short-term debt called 
anticipatiepenningen and consolidating its long-term bonds into perpetuities, in order to avoid 
a recurrence of the liquidity squeeze experienced during the war crisis of 1672. In addition the 
company received small advances from the Amsterdam Wisselbank, mostly to finance the 
bullion supplied by the bank for shipment to Asia (Nieuwkerk 2009, Dehing 2012). 
 Despite the evident investor concerns about VOC bonds, company directors’ liability for 
debt and the legal personhood of companies do not appear to have become pressing issues in 
need of a clear legal solution. The Delft directors of the whaling association Noordsche 
Compagnie, set up in 1614, lost their claim to have limited liability in 1625 and ended up sharing 
an unpaid bill for beer supplied (Van Brakel 1909). The promoters of an insurance company 
presumably took this as a cue to limit directors’ liability, with apparent approval, for the debate 
about the proposal during 1629-1635 passed over its corporate governance to centre on 
operational aspects of the business (Blok 1900a, b). The 1621 West-Indische Compagnie (West 
India Company, WIC) charter, issued by the Estates General after another long debate, retained 
the same clause as the VOC charter protecting the directors only from untimely demands for 
accounts and from claims for pay arrears, that is, they remained formally liable for debt and 
for the cashiers and bookkeepers. This did not prevent the WIC from becoming even more 
heavily reliant on debt than its sister company, though for different reasons (Den Heijer 2007).  
 Plans for an Atlantic monopoly trading company had circulated since 1600 (Meijer 1986, 
Van Rees 1868), but entrenched private interests and later the truce with Spain prevented their 
adoption, until the resumption of war in 1621 provided the impetus to consolidate trade into a 
VOC-type concern with a monopoly for 24 years and attack the Luso-Hispanic empire in the 
Americas. Modeled on its sister company, the WIC had five departments or chambers running 
operations and directed by a central board, but it differed in three important respects from the 
VOC (Den Heijer 2005). First, the company would establish colonial settlements for Dutch 
emigrants as well as engage in trade and warfare. Second, the Estates General took a direct 
interest by supplying 500,000 guilders of the 7.1 million initial capital. Additional clauses gave 
further assurances of financial and practical support. Third, commercial and non-commercial 
operations were kept in separate accounts, so as to avoid the latter from draining the former 
unseen. As for the WIC’s corporate governance, early charter drafts had aimed to remedy the 
VOC’s perceived shortcomings by granting more power to shareholders, but the WIC charter 
merely nodded in that direction.  Accounts would be published every six years and directors 
stood to lose pay if this failed to happen on time.  
 Given investors’ repeated protests about the right to monitor and control the use of their 
own money in companies like this, one would have expected rather more. However, the Estates 
General clearly thought that such rights were subordinate to the company’s public tasks and 
therefore ignored them. The market begged to differ. Despite frantic canvassing by officials 
subscriptions came in very slowly, partly because the WIC’s business prospects were considered 
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poor, partly because the ongoing battle between the VOC board and shareholders highlighted the 
corporate governance defects copied into the WIC. The Estates General tackled the former issue 
first, by adding the Venezuelan salt trade to the company’s monopoly in 1622. When that failed 
to stimulate investors enough, a postscript was added to the charter giving hoofdparticipanten, 
shareholders with more than a certain amount of shares, the right to nominate new directors from 
their midst. Meanwhile the Amsterdam chamber had recognized the need to bring these big 
shareholders into the fold and negotiated a twelve-point corporate governance agreement with 
them. Approved by the Estates General, this agreement gave the big shareholders board 
representation, the right to approve charter changes, board appointments, and debt issues, plus 
the right to audit the internal accounts of annual expeditions (L'Honoré Naber 1931). These 
assurances broke the deadlock. In October 1623 subscriptions closed on a total of 7.1 million 
guilders and shareholders responded quickly to the board’s 1624 call for another 3.5 million.  
 The WIC had a good start, overcoming Spanish and Portuguese resistance to establish 
footholds in West Africa and the Caribbean, expanding trade and, to cap it all, capturing Spain’s 
entire 1628 silver fleet worth 11.5 million guilders. Only 1.5 million of this windfall was 
reinvested in the business, the rest was disbursed. In 1629 the company paid its first dividend of 
25 per cent, and a further 50 per cent the following year. The tide soon turned, however. 
Attempts to dislodge the established colonial empires failed, the Caribbean footholds proved too 
small for a remunerative business on the WIC’s scale, the handsome profits from its West 
African trade and privateering were not enough to finance the heavy military costs, and private 
merchants chipped away parts of the monopoly. To sustain its business the company made two 
further calls on shareholders taking the capital to more than 17 million guilders by 1639, but this 
required issuing a kind of preference shares with a dividend guarantee of first eight, then six per 
cent. Even then shareholders failed to fully take up their allotments. Under such circumstances 
raising debt at 5.5 per cent was cheaper, and some chambers took this option (Schneeloch 1971, 
1982, Den Heijer 2007).  
 As the company’s debt mounted, the share price slipped, so it became increasingly 
difficult to obtain funding even for profitable ventures, as suppliers of funding realized that a 
share of the proceeds would first go towards satisfying existing creditors, leaving too little 
reward for their investment.  This lack of funding even for positive-Net Present Value projects 
when a company approaches insolvency is termed  ‘debt overhang’ by financial economists, and 
the associated loss of overall firm value is considered an important agency cost of high leverage 
(Myers, 1977). The debt overhang problem can only be resolved if new claims can be issued that 
are effectively senior to the existing debt; equity finance and junior or unsecured debt finance are 
no longer available. The WIC resolved the problem by recourse to bottomry loans that secured 
the newly issued debt on the ship and its cargo, thus making it possible to raise new money by 
effectively conferring seniority on the new debt. These loans were largely placed with 
shareholders to compensate them for the suspension of dividends.  
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 By the mid-1640s the WIC was no longer a viable operation in itself, and had become a 
rubber stamp operation dependent on revenue generated by licensing private merchants to trade 
under its monopoly and privateers to prey on competitors. Strenuous efforts by the board, 
supported by the state, to merge the WIC with the VOC foundered on the latter’s stubborn 
refusal to take on a structural loss maker, so the WIC limped on. At the end of the 1650s all 
outstanding debts were restructured into a single type of bond carrying two per cent interest, 
which the company could not even pay. In 1664 the situation had become so difficult that the 
board suspended its regular accounts and launched desperate schemes to get money, tying 
specific profits to preferential claims which shareholders and creditors could obtain by paying 
five or six per cent of their holding. To force a more permanent solution the Estates General 
made the charter prolongation in 1671 conditional on the WIC possessing a permanent fund of 1 
million guilders for business operations. A fight developed between the directors, shareholders, 
and creditors over the conditions for supplying fresh capital, directors defending their position, 
shareholders clamoring for more control, creditors proposing ways to generate cash.  
 In 1674 agreement was finally reached to replace the old company with a new WIC 
(Schneeloch 1971, 1973, 1982; Den Heijer 2007). The agreement envisaged a capital of 4.5 
million guilders. Shareholders and creditors would supply 3.3 million guilders by swapping old 
claims for new shares and 1.2 million in cash by paying up a percentage of their claims. 
Shareholders paid up four per cent of face value to receive 15 per cent of face value in new 
shares; creditors prior to 1656 paid eight per cent for 30 per cent. However, creditors after 1656 
did not have to pay a percentage, yet received the full amount of their claim in shares, 
presumably because they had hardly received any interest payments. The WIC’s gigantic debt 
and its survival until the reorganization of 1674 suggests that the directors must have possessed 
limited liability. The company had a huge board, but the burden far outstripped its combined 
capacity or likely appetite for personally contracting debt. Indeed, the episode underlined a 
danger of limited liability, the risk of raising too much debt. The new charter freed the WIC from 
the burdens of war, cut costs by halving the company’s large number of directors, and changed 
its corporate governance by giving shareholders and creditors one third of board positions each, 
the old directors supplying the other third. It took three years for the conversion to generate the 
required 1 million guilders cash, enabling the WIC to embark on a relatively calm and 
prosperous phase of its existence.  
 
3.  Branching out, 1680-1795 
The size, corporate form, monopoly, and financial structure of the two chartered companies 
remained very much the exception during the Dutch Golden Age. Other very large businesses, 
such as Louis de Geer’s arms trade and manufacturing conglomerate, the merchant house of the 
brothers Trip, or Jean Deutz’s trade and finance operations, were all traditional partnerships 
financed with equity, small family deposits, retained earnings, and trade credit, if needed topped 
up by lombarding securities with acquaintances or on the call money market at the exchange 
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(Breedvelt-Van Veen 1935, Elias 1963, Klein 1965). The same was true for the much smaller 
firms in processing industries such as brewing and sugar refining, and also for shipyards. Even 
large firms in these sectors rarely had assets of more than 20,000-50,000 guilders, an amount 
easily raised by two to three partners. 
 Conditions changed once the Republic had entered its climacteric sometime during the 
last quarter of the 17th century. Economic activities concentrated in big ports such as Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam, to the detriment of smaller cities like Enkhuizen or Delft. A process of 
consolidation began in export-oriented industries such as brewing, sugar refining, malting, and 
salt refining, and by the 1740s this had given rise to firms with assets of 100,000-250,000 
guilders run by professional, salaried managers (Visser 1927, De Vries 1968, Yntema 1992, 
Unger 2001). Financially these firms conformed to the customary pattern of avoiding leverage 
by relying on equity, retained earnings, and some trade credit. As a rule shares were closely held 
by family members and perhaps a business associate, and any new equity was raised within the 
same circle. Declining opportunities prompted investors to hold on to assets, so that the shares in 
such businesses tended to stay in families, with holdings fragmenting from one generation to the 
next to create a rising number of shareholders. The growing distance between owners and 
managers necessitated the molding of the specific-purpose partnership into a form closely 
resembling a limited liability company. Such firms were set up for a period of ten to twenty years, 
and they had transferable shares and regular shareholders’ meetings to discuss operations and 
results. Shareholders appointed commissarissen or non-executive directors for monitoring the 
managers. In one Amsterdam brewery, De Hooiberg, these non-executives inspected the 
accounts every fortnight, and the manager had to consult them about all large transactions (Van 
Eeghen 1958).  
 This close monitoring shows that shareholders were aware of agency issues arising 
because their manager was not only increasingly drawn from outside their own social circle, but 
also was no longer personally liable for company debt. That is to say, by now some specific-
purpose partnerships had evolved further towards limited liability companies and possessed a 
form of legal personhood. This does not appear to have created confusion, presumably because 
people could tell the liability regime of firms they dealt with from the name. The Dutch term for 
limited liability companies, naamloze vennootschappen or literally nameless partnerships, 
denoted firms without the names of liable partners. If a business name mentioned specific people, 
e.g. Jansen & Janssens, or Hope & Co., the partners had full liability. If it did not, as for instance 
in the case of the Amsterdam brewery De Hooiberg (The Haystack) discussed above, then the 
business operated under limited liability. Thus there was no need for prospectuses or company 
statutes of the 17th and 18th century to mention the liability regime, as it was evident from the 
name chosen for the company. This evolution must have taken place between the 1629-1635 
insurance company proposal with its limited liability clause, and 1720, as we will see. The most 
likely decade in which things moved forward is the 1640s, when the WIC began running up debt 
without apparently alarming either directors or investors about its liability regime.  
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 The flurry of proposals for new companies circulating in 1720, detailed in the Groote 
Tafereel der Dwaasheid (The Great Mirror of Folly) shows the extent to which specific-purpose 
partnerships had evolved into limited liability companies (Groote tafereel, 1720, Groeneveld 
1940, Gelderblom and Jonker, forthcoming). Hoping to take advantage of the speculative fever 
that had spread from Paris to London and then the Republic, promoters launched 40 projects 
between June and October. Fanned by the Republic’s keen intercity rivalry, the projects closely 
resembled each other. They used the credit of local public officials such as mayors and aldermen 
to attract investors to their IPO, but were otherwise entirely private companies, not hybrids like 
the VOC or WIC. The companies’ names expressed ambitions for an operational scope ranging 
from insurance to other financial services, trade, and transport. Towards this end huge capitals of 
up to 100 million guilders were to be raised, but investors were required to deposit only 1-2 per 
cent, sometimes a bit more at first, on penalty of forfeiting their subscription. Subsequent calls 
would be decided by managers, by shareholders or their representatives, or by a combination of 
those. The corporate structure, though differing in details from project to project, was that of 
joint-stock limited liability companies. Managers were monitored by non-executives appointed 
by either all or only the large shareholders, sometimes assisted by local officials. Regular 
accounts would be presented to shareholders or their representatives, who would then set 
dividends. A few proposals stipulated limited liability for shareholders, but none of them limited 
or even described the directors’ liability, not even for the conduct of bookkeepers and cashiers, 
since the company names chosen made that clear.  
 In the Republic’s fragmented polity such company proposals needed only the approval of 
local authorities in provinces such as Holland and Zeeland, while in others, provincial 
government approval was also required. The Amsterdam city council, swayed by opposition 
from powerful local merchants to the entry of a well-capitalized competitor into the insurance 
business and possibly also by misgivings about stoking speculative fever, turned down a sensible 
insurance company proposal in June, prompting the Rotterdam council to adopt a very similar 
one. Officials elsewhere, however, were anxious to stimulate flagging economic growth and 
approved 32 of the 40 projects. Only eight passed from the initial subscription stage to develop 
any business at all, of which six became operational, though on a much smaller scale than 
originally envisaged. The high early termination rate reflects the lack of impact which the 
speculative climate of 1720 had on the country. 
 With Dutch public debt markets stable and secure, there was no large debt-equity swap 
vehicle, such as the Mississippi and South Sea companies, to boost expectations. Moreover, 
investors were skeptical that local economies could be kick-started with huge infusions of capital, 
and they also recognized the attraction of consolidating insurance, so they bought into the few 
viable insurance proposals and spurned the crowd of small-town hopefuls. No more than four 
companies, from Rotterdam, Delft, Gouda, and one of two from Middelburg, all mainly focused 
on insurance, attracted sufficient interest to push their share price substantially above par. The 
best performer, Rotterdam, peaked at 186 per cent of par, hardly a bubble level. Of those four, 
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the Delft and Gouda companies disappeared after a few years. The Middelburg insurance 
company survived for longer, but left no traces; and a trading company from the same city, 
Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, went into business with a paid-in capital of 1.4 million 
guilders, about 1/7th of its intended size, to develop a flourishing business in the Atlantic slave 
trade (Reinders Folmer- Van Prooijen 2000). The Rotterdam Maatschappij van Assurantie, 
Disconto en Beleening proved the most durable, surviving into the 21st century, but that company 
had to drastically scale down its size and ambitions as well. The board reduced the nominal 
capital from 15 million guilders at the end of September to 8.5 million two years later, of which 
about 5 per cent, or under 0.5 million guilders was paid in. That proved entirely sufficient to 
conduct a sound if not exactly dynamic insurance business (Slechte 1970, Van de Laar and 
Vleesenbeek 1990). 
 The hausse of 1720 did not, therefore, channel much money into excessively speculative 
new ventures in the Republic, nor do investors appear to have been burnt, contrary to what was 
believed at the time and later by some (Frehen, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst, 2013). Even so the 
stock exchange climate was buoyant enough for some opportunistic moves. A pre-existing 
colonial trade syndicate reorganized itself into the joint-stock company Sociëteit Berbice with a 
share capital of 3.2 million guilders (divided into 1,600 shares of 2,000 guilders each), and 
launched a public offering of 1,200 shares, on which 400 shares were to be retained by the 
original owners. This attempt to foist a languishing business onto investors was only partially 
successful; only 941 shares, not much more than three quarters of the total offered, were sold. 
The board had great difficulty in persuading the shareholders to pay up once the prospects of 
the enterprise became clear: by 1732 only 42 per cent of capital had been paid in; 50 per cent 
was due by 1724 according to the original schedule. The WIC also jumped on the bandwagon 
(Van Gelder 2012). Since November 1719 its share price had risen steadily, in line with that 
of the VOC, from a normal trading range of about 80 per cent of par to 200 by July. In early 
August the Estates General gave permission to issue 1,600 new shares priced probably at 250. 
This rights issue looks suspicious. First, the board pushed for it though having no idea how to 
use the money once the Amsterdam city council had refused its request to diversify into 
insurance. Second, the 1,600 shares at 250 per cent should have raised 12 million guilders, but 
the company received no more than 3.7 million. No more than 100 shares actually reached the 
market; 500 were given away for free, probably as bribes to officials, and 1,000 were sold to 
shareholders at par, enabling them to cash in on the inflated market price.  
 Thus the issue appears to have been designed to unload overpriced shares on the 
public (Gelderblom and Jonker forthcoming, pace Frehen, Goetzman and Rouwenhorst, 2013). 
Given the WIC’s highly concentrated shareholding this should not have been difficult to 
organize. Suspicions are confirmed by subsequent events. Following an August peak of 450 
the board secured permission to float another share issue at that price in mid-September. It 
was too late.  Market sentiment had already turned, so the WIC tried pushing the flotation; its 
shares continued to rise against the trend of falling prices. Even so the issue flopped, raising 
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no more than 7,500 guilders of a projected 13.5 million. Nor did the money ease the WIC’s 
worsening position. During the 18th century it lost further ground as private merchants eroded 
its monopoly. The company first kept going first by building up debt, then by suspending its 
own trading operations, and finally by leaning on the Estates General for subsidies to maintain 
the West African forts. In 1791 the WIC was nationalized by the Estates General who bought 
up the shares at 30 per cent, giving shareholders an eight per cent windfall over the going 
price (Den Heijer 2007).  
 Meanwhile the VOC struggled in the face of mounting competition. The intra-Asian 
trade turned into a structural loss maker, the costs of controlling spice supplies rose 
inexorably while European prices fell, and the policy of routing all goods through Batavia 
became uncompetitive as rivals set up direct routes between Asian production centres and 
Europe. The VOC responded imaginatively at first, trebling the annual number of arriving 
ships and sales between 1670 and 1730, changing its product mix towards higher-value goods, 
and experimenting with direct routes (Gaastra 1989, 2003). However, from 1730 revenues fell 
and new ideas ran out. Instead of facing reality and cutting high payouts to shareholders, the 
board continued them and used mounting debt to plug the resulting budgetary holes, just like 
the WIC had done (Van Zanden 1996). 
 Though financially irresponsible, this policy was rational enough under the 
circumstances. Unable to raise equity, the company relied entirely on debt. Although apart 
from regular auction prices no operational information at all was published, investors 
suspected something and from 1732 the share price glided downwards. Cutting dividends 
would have undermined confidence further and raised the cost of borrowing, so the board was 
wedded to high dividends. From the end of the 1730s the VOC’s annual cash flow regularly 
turned negative. Repeated attempts to reform operations brought some relief in the form of 
higher revenues, but directors failed to bring about the fundamental overhaul which their 
business needed (Steur 1984, Jonker and Sluyterman 2000). By 1760 debt had risen to 32.3 
million guilders, overwhelmingly in short-term maturities. During the Fourth Anglo-Dutch 
War (1780-1784) the company entered a liquidity crisis from which it never recovered. 
Emergency funding from various authorities plus a state-guaranteed bond loan kept operations 
going until the bankrupt VOC was nationalized following the French invasion of 1795. A 
contingent casualty was Amsterdam’s proud Wisselbank, which had clandestinely supplied 
large advances to the company. 
 The decline of the colonial companies stands in stark contrast to the flowering of 
Amsterdam’s financial market during the second half of the 18th century, harmed remarkably 
little by the 1763 and 1773 crises (De Jong-Keesing 1939, Schnabel and Shin 2004). The 
colonial commodities sector pioneered an innovative finance method in the form of mortgage-
backed debt using the special-purpose legal vehicles first launched by Jean Deutz in 1695 for 
repackaging his mercury-backed loans to the Austrian emperor (Elias 1963, Van der Voort 1973). 
Called negotiatie and first sold by the Deutz firm in 1753, these vehicles enabled Caribbean 
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plantation owners to borrow at the Republic’s low interest rates. A negotiatie owned one or more 
mortgages on Caribbean sugar, coffee, and cacao plantations, investors buying bonds issued by 
the vehicle. A merchant banker initiated and managed them, servicing the loan with the proceeds 
of the plantation’s product sales which he typically had exclusive rights to handle as well, and 
charging commission all around: on arranging the mortgage, on organizing and managing the 
vehicle, on shipping and product sales, on interest payments.  
 In essence merchants boosted their own business while any risk of default was passed on 
to investors. Since plantations were always short of cash there was a rush to use this license for 
printing money. Within a few years some 80 million guilders was raised, which caused a serious 
credit inflation in the areas concerned: rapidly rising plantation prices, doubtful or downright 
fraudulent mortgage appraisals and imprudently lenient lending limits, overindebted plantation 
owners, overproduction of commodities. When during the early 1770s product prices dropped 
and slave revolts further undermined planters’ capacity to pay, loans started to default one by one 
until by 1780 nearly all were in serious arrears. Though ultimately some negotiaties recovered 
through prudent management (Jonker 2002), most had to be written off entirely. The negotiatie 
vehicle did not spread to other economic sectors for a lack of demand, but some of the foreign 
loans floated during the 1780s and 1790s did adopt this or a similar form. 
 Another remarkable innovation appeared in 1774 when Abraham van Ketwich opened 
the first investment trust, called Eendracht Maakt Macht (“Strength Through Unity”). Designed 
to offer the benefits of an actively managed diversified portfolio to smaller investors, this fund 
looked remarkably like modern-day closed investment mutual funds (Berghuis 1967, 
Rouwenhorst 2005). The market was not ready for it; Van Ketwich’s trust, together with two 
copycat funds launched in its wake, attracted no more than 2.5 million guilders, of which three 
quarters was lost during the political upheavals of the late 18th century. Presumably investors 
preferred to build their own portfolios from the rapidly rising number of primarily foreign 
securities on the market. Marketed by dense networks of brokers throughout the country (Buist 
1974), these loans to countries including Austria, Sweden, Poland, Russia, Denmark, Portugal, 
Spain, and the fledgling USA, totalled some 1,500 million guilders by 1800 (Riley 1980). 
Though decried at the time as unpatriotic, this outflow in fact underlined the lack of 
remunerative home investment opportunities, interest rates in the Republic remaining very low, 
much lower than those abroad. 
 
4. New challenges, 1795-1850   
The upheavals of the late 18th century inaugurated a period of economic stagnation lasting some 
fifty years. As a French satellite state from 1795 to 1813, the Netherlands found itself an enemy 
of Britain, its usual ally, which occupied the Dutch colonial possessions one by one. Moreover, 
the embargoes imposed by either side forced merchants to devise ever more ingenious ways to 
keep trade going until they had to accept a virtual standstill from 1811 (Jonker and Sluyterman 
2000). Recovery after the restoration of independence in 1813 proved slow. Amsterdam had 
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totally lost its former commercial entrepot function, reducing trade to serving the needs of the 
immediate hinterland (Jonker 1996). The colonial possessions were restored, but Dutch 
merchants found it hard to dislodge entrenched British and American rivals, partly for a lack of 
competitive manufacturing exports. 
 This situation started to improve gradually from the mid-1820s, when the government 
adopted a comprehensive neo-mercantilist economic policy built around the Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij (NHM, 1824), a large colonial trading company loosely modelled on the 
VOC (Jonker and Sluyterman 2000). The NHM acted as government agent for shipping and 
selling colonial commodities levied as taxes in kind by the colonial authorities in the Dutch East 
Indies. The above-market freight rates paid by the NHM boosted Dutch shipbuilding, while 
carefully designed tariffs prompted the rise of a mechanized processing industry, notably sugar 
refining, which in turn stimulated the growth of engineering (Van Zanden 1987). By 1850 both 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam possessed large and thriving engineering works, in Amsterdam 
originating in the processing industries and in Rotterdam in government-sponsored shipping 
lines and navy orders. Both cities also had large gasworks for lighting their streets and the 
increasing number of tall factory buildings such as Amsterdam’s mechanized sugar refineries. 
The engineering works, sugar refineries, and gas works dwarfed other nascent industries, such as 
the Twenthe and Brabant textile mills. Meanwhile railway building had also taken off. During 
the late 1830s two companies were set up with the aim of constructing lines to Belgium and to 
Germany. The first train service opened in 1839 (Fritschy 1983, Van den Broeke 1985, 
Veenendaal 1998). 
 Existing legal and financial frameworks proved entirely adequate to facilitate this early 
phase of Dutch industrialization (Jonker 1996). During the French occupation the legal system 
had undergone a profound overhaul at the top, but this had failed to leave much impact on 
existing business practice. In 1811 Napoleon had imposed the Code de Commerce, which 
recognized three basic forms of business organization: the private partnership with unlimited 
liability; the private limited liability company, commanditaire vennootschap or CV in Dutch; and 
the joint-stock limited liability company, termed naamloze vennootschap or NV. The first two 
required no more formalities than the registration of a deed of partnership with the local court, 
but the statutes of an NV now had to obtain official approval, an administrative novelty. Until 
then limited liability companies had been set up by a simple notarized deed, like for instance the 
Associatie Cassa, the first Dutch joint-stock limited liability bank, as recently as 1806. Moreover, 
after the restoration of independence the government strove to expand its administrative grip, 
with successive proposals to replace the French code laying down procedures for official 
monitoring of annual reports, minutes of general shareholders’ meetings, and even capitalization. 
The far-reaching proposals for a continuous assessment foundered in the face of vociferous 
protests from the business community, but the prior official approval of company statutes 
remained in the new Wetboek van Koophandel (commercial code) finally accepted by 
Parliament in 1838.  
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 This was not a dead letter; the Government turned down proposed companies at least 
twice, in 1837 and in 1857, both banking projects. The number of NVs grew only slowly, 
reaching 137 for the whole of the Netherlands in 1850. However, businessmen could easily 
circumvent the law by setting up a CV with tradable shares instead, and they did so on a fairly 
large scale. During the 1820s many insurance firms adopted this form. The two biggest 
Amsterdam manufacturers, an engineering company and a sugar refiner, were both CVs with 
tradable shares until they were finally reorganised into NVs under pressure from large creditors 
during the 1840s. We may thus conclude that the law imposed little in the way of restraint on 
business organization. Nor did the code provide stimuli to create disciplinary mechanisms on 
limited liability companies through the market, for instance by forcing them to publish regular 
audited accounts. As a result none of them did so until during the 1840s one of the railway 
companies, foreseeing a need for continued access to equity funding, started issuing monthly 
traffic statements and annual balance sheets in order to promote investor confidence. This helped 
to turn the tide; from the early 1850s publishing something in the way of annual accounts 
gradually became the norm. 
 The growth of corporate business did not encounter any structural funding bottlenecks 
either. The notion that a lack of finance slowed down Dutch industrialization has been 
conclusively proven false by evidence that the financial system fully retained its remarkable 
capability for raising large sums with effortless ease (De Vries 1982, Jonker 1991, 1996). The 
market retained its singular configuration centering on a public exchange where a large and 
varied crowd of merchant bankers, underwriters, and brokers ruled the roost. As often as not they 
conducted a mix of operations, dealing in commodities, securities, insurance, and call money at 
the same time. Since the late 18th century and quite likely much earlier the prolongatie or on-call 
market functioned as the hub of the system, as businessmen would habitually put any surplus 
cash in securities, to be lombarded when cash was needed (Jonker 1996). The Wisselbank had 
ceased operations, but the Associatie Cassa flourished and inspired one or two followers on a 
much smaller scale, while the Rotterdam firm of R. Mees & Zn. also cautiously advanced from 
cashiers’ services into banking. In 1814 King William I set up the Nederlandsche Bank as a 
circulation bank for his new kingdom. Facing strong opposition from the Amsterdam financial 
world to what they viewed as outside interference, the bank developed only slowly. It slotted 
seamlessly into the dominant pattern of short-term credit on bill discounts and securities 
lombards, so both its operations and its notes remained modest in scale and local in scope until 
the late 1840s. The securities market became more transparent with the publication of a regular 
price list in 1796 and it also obtained a notable new feature in the form of administratiekantoren 
set up by brokers to promote liquidity during the rough trading years of the Napoleonic era 
(Veenendaal 1996, Jonker 1996). Roughly similar to trustee offices, these institutes issued 
guilder-denominated certificates in lieu of the pools of original securities held by them. By 
simplifying trade and lowering the cost of handling interest and redemption payments for 
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investors, administratiekantoren materially supported the voluminous trade in both Dutch and 
foreign securities and enhanced the market’s ability to raise large sums (Veenendaal 1996).  
 New issues were handled by one or more of the merchant banks and sold using the 
network of commissionairs or underwriters perfected during the late 18th century (Buist 1974). 
Hope & Co.’s hold over Russian loans continued into the 1850s; except for those loans 
Amsterdam had lost its position as the leading international primary market to London and 
had to content itself with being the first among secondary markets. Foreign securities 
continued to dominate stock exchange price lists, contrasting sharply with the meager number 
of Dutch industrials, but this should not be taken as an indication that investors shunned home 
securities. Any new venture or going concern offering returns at or above the yield on public 
debt had little difficulty in raising money (Jonker 1996). The low number of home industrials 
merely reflected the  delay in Dutch industrialization relative to the United Kingdom, Belgium, 
or France, plus the fact that companies organized as CVs with tradable shares functioned a little 
like clubs, the shares usually being closely held and therefore not very liquid. True, not every 
scheme to raise money was successful, but the few examples of failure, and of ventures financed 
by imported capital, all concern either politically unpopular proposals, such as the Nederlandsche 
Bank in 1814, or struggling performers such as the railways and the engineering works after the 
end of the neo-mercantilist policies during the 1840s, or instances of foreign technology imports 
paid with equity stakes, as did one of the railways and a number of utility companies.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Early Modern Dutch corporate finance neatly illustrates both the power and the limitations of the 
virtuous circle of financial innovation. The creative spurt at the beginning of the 17th century 
started just such a circle, increasing the scale of corporate business and calling forth new forms 
of organization, of governance, of participation, of finance and of financing techniques, but also 
provoking shareholder protests and revealing inherent limitations in the new forms. The general 
framework of the VOC and WIC proved far too cumbersome for general adoption, and the 
chartered companies’ peculiar corporate governance model, with its heavy state involvement, 
was not to survive. But the emergence of a sophisticated securities trade in the wake of the VOC 
and WIC was a leap ahead, spawning a continuously widening array of finance options and 
investment opportunities which, combined with the growing surplus of available savings and a 
flexible legal system, ensured until 1850 and beyond that any viable business opportunity could 
obtain funding. That said, even the most sophisticated and flexible financing options could not 
prevent Dutch economic decline, nor were they enough to jump-start the economy after the 
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